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The London Ambassadorship 
of David K. E. Bruce During the 
Wilson-Johnson Years, 1964–68 
JONATHAN COLMAN 
Using recently released sources, this article offers a fresh perspective on the London
ambassadorship of David K. E. Bruce in the years of Harold Wilson and Lyndon
Johnson, 1964–68. Bruce’s running of the US Embassy is examined, as are his
views of the Anglo-American relationship. Further attention is given to his diplomatic
management of the Anglo-American relationship in the context of the difficult per-
sonal relations between Wilson and Johnson and with regard to policy differences
over the Vietnam War and Britain’s position as a world power. It is argued that
while Bruce did help to ease some of the personal strains between Wilson and
Johnson, he was generally less significant to the White House than has previously
been asserted. It is also contended that his vision of Britain joining the EEC, yet
retaining extensive military commitments beyond Europe was not viable.
In 1961, President Kennedy appointed David K. E. Bruce to the
post of United States Ambassador to the Court of St James, a position
in which he remained until 1969. Labour prime minister Harold
Wilson, elected in 1964, described Bruce as “a giant among diplomats,
with more experience and wise judgment than possibly anyone else
in the diplomatic profession of any country.” Both the White House
and the State Department had “total” confidence in his capabilities, and
it was unlikely that “in modern times any Prime Minister and American
The article is based on a paper presented under the aegis of the Transatlantic
Studies Association, at the British Association for American Studies conference at
Aberystwyth, April 2003. The author would like to thank the anonymous referee for
Diplomacy and Statecraft and Professor Len Scott for providing constructive
comments on earlier drafts, as well as Sir Michael Palliser and Sir Oliver Wright for
consenting to be interviewed about Bruce. Dr Michael Hopkins supervised the doctoral
dissertation from which this article derives. 
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328 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
Ambassador have been closer.”1 The foreign policy practitioner and
academic Henry Kissinger believed that throughout a lengthy diplo-
matic career Bruce helped to “ennoble” American foreign policy.2
An assessment from the British Foreign Office described the
Ambassador as “a man of very considerable stature.”3 It would seem
fortunate that in the years of Harold Wilson and Lyndon Johnson
there was a figure of such calibre participating in the Anglo-American
relationship, as the mutual dealings of the two leaders were, as
a number of historians have noted, fractious and troubled.4 Against
a background of British economic decline, there was an adverse per-
sonal chemistry between the principals as well as substantial diver-
gences of policy between Britain and the United States. Of these
divergences the Vietnam War demanded of Bruce the highest degree
of diplomatic intervention to help ease the strain. The British unwilling-
ness to commit troops meant that policy-makers in Washington
tended to see as self-seeking and essentially a nuisance the British
desire to exert a moderating influence upon the war. There was a
further erosion of Britain’s standing in Washington as a result of the
plans, announced in 1967 and accelerated in 1968, to evacuate most
of the country’s military bases “East of Suez.” This left the forces of
the United States exposed at a politically vulnerable time as the sole
peacekeeper in Asia, while the withdrawal itself complemented the
UK’s adoption of a more modest focus to its diplomacy by seeking
membership of the European Economic Community (EEC, or
“Common Market”). 
Philip Kaiser, deputy at the US Embassy, has suggested that
Bruce was “a superb interlocutor” between Wilson and Johnson,5
but most of the literature of Anglo-American relations tends to confine
him (like most ambassadors) to a largely incidental and somewhat
passive role, that of dispensing information to the State Department
and to the White House, and enlightening British policy-makers on
Washington’s views.6 Tasks of this nature were indeed fundamental
to Bruce’s activities, but given his centrality to the Anglo-American
relationship he does deserve more attention: how, for example, did
he run his embassy? What were his own views about the ties
between Britain and the United States? How far did he influence the
relationship between Wilson and Johnson? To be sure, Bruce has not
been entirely neglected. Nelson K. Lankford has provided a worthy
biography of him, based largely on the Ambassador’s diaries depo-
sited at the Virginia Historical Society in Richmond, Virginia. Lankford
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maintains that after the death of President Kennedy in November
1963 Bruce came “into his own as ambassador in London. In tem-
perament, in style, in almost every way unlike the new president,
Bruce nevertheless became important to a White House untutored in
foreign affairs.”7 The release in recent years of a growing amount of
government documents, oral history testimonies and secondary
material in Britain and the United States has presented an opportunity
to reassess Bruce’s time as US Ambassador to the UK. This paper
focuses mainly on the tumultuous years of 1964–68, when Wilson’s
Labour government coincided with the Democratic administration
of Lyndon Johnson and in which the difficult relationship between
the two leaders, the Vietnam War, British economic weakness and
the abandonment of the world role imposed notable strains on the
Anglo-American relationship. Bruce offered an invaluable vantage
point on all these developments, and he did exert some moderating
influence on the difficult relationship between Wilson and Johnson.
However, in many ways he was less important to the White House
than has been asserted, and his idealistic and firmly held vision of a
Britain upholding the roles both of world power and a member of the
EEC was simply not tenable. So far as his day-to-day management
of the Embassy was concerned, his style was very much “hands-
off,” but this, too, was not without its problems. 
Kennedy’s choice of ambassador to London — still one of the
most prestigious of ambassadorial posts — was entirely logical in
the light of his appointee’s outstanding diplomatic pedigree and, in
particular, his experience running large embassies. Born in 1898,
Bruce began his career in foreign affairs in 1926, in Rome as Vice
Consul in the Foreign Service, and he came to hold a number of
more senior positions, including in the Office of Strategic Services
(OSS, the forerunner of the CIA) in 1941, Chief of the European
Cooperation Administration to France 1948–49, Ambassador to
France 1949–52, and Undersecretary of State 1952–53. In 1953–54
he was Special United States Observer at the Interim Committee of
the European Defense Community and Special American Represen-
tative to the European High Authority for Coal and Steel. From
1957–60 he was US Ambassador to West Germany.8 
The Anglo-American so-called “special relationship” — at the heart
of which Bruce participated from 1961 — stemmed largely from the
intimate practical cooperation during the Second World War and
rested upon a nexus of continued institutional ties in the fields of
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330 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
defence and intelligence, as well as frequent and prominent dealings
between presidents and prime ministers, and between lower-ranking
officials. The organization of the London Embassy reflected in
microcosm the continued convergence of Anglo-American interests.
American experts on the British political scene, and on different
regions of the world, worked with officers who dealt with the whole
spectrum of overlapping interests. There were sections on economics,
military affairs, intelligence, information, culture, science, consular
and legal affairs, and, of course, administration. To deal with these
tasks, the Embassy had a combined staff of some 700 people.9 This fig-
ure represented one of the largest diplomatic contingents of all American
legations and embassies, which in 1965 ranged in number from a mere
two people in Gambia to as many as 788 in South Vietnam.10 
On the question of managing the Embassy, Kaiser reported that
Bruce ruled “with an easy hand. He gave his officers great leeway in
carrying out their responsibilities, providing support whenever they
needed it.”11 Another member of Bruce’s staff, Jonathan Stoddart,
noted that “Everybody thought Bruce was above the fray and did not
involve himself in the more mundane operations of the embassy. He
delegated very well, assuming he had competent people working for
him.”12 According to Hermann Eilts, a Political Officer at the
Embassy, Bruce “was interested in everything that went on” there.
“He delegated authority, but at the same time when you needed the
Ambassador’s help on anything, you could go to him and he would
immediately respond.”13 Michael Palliser, Wilson’s Foreign Office
private secretary after March 1966, had frequent dealings with
Bruce and other US officials and has noted that the Ambassador’s
“hands off” approach was generally appreciated by the Embassy
staff, as it showed confidence in their abilities.14 Yet Bruce’s
detached style of management had its deficiencies. Richard Ericson,
who served in the Political Section of the Embassy, noted that on
one occasion the Senate “invited David Bruce back to address the
Foreign Affairs Committee on how you ran an embassy because he
was a diplomat of such distinction.” He presented “a letter-perfect
description of how an embassy should be run,” but this description
and how he actually ran his embassy were “at opposite poles.”
Working for Bruce was “like being part of a catamaran . . . one hull
was here and one hull was off there and never the twain would meet.
He was very difficult to see, very busy.” Even Kaiser had limited
access: “He had to make appointments like everybody else unless it
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was a real crisis.” Furthermore, the consensus “among those of us
who were working in external affairs was that David Bruce never
saw a damn thing that went out of that embassy before it went out
except the stuff that he wrote himself.”15 
Philip Kaiser has suggested that the Embassy had an “excep-
tional staff of officers,”16 Michael Palliser has stated that Bruce “had
a good embassy,”17 and, similarly, Oliver Wright, Palliser’s pre-
decessor as Wilson’s Foreign Office secretary, has commented that
it was a “first-class operation.”18 Yet such favourable opinions were not
universal at the time. The Permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign
Office, Paul Gore-Booth, noted in 1965 that there was a view “not
confined by any means to the Foreign Office, that the US Embassy
here at the moment is regrettably weak.”19 While praising Bruce’s
personality and character, Gore-Booth felt that he did not: 
. . . get around quite as universally as he might, no doubt partly because he does not
get any younger . . . The [American] Department [of the Foreign Office] find that,
unlike members of the American Embassy over the years, the present staff do not
seem to go around and gossip as an Embassy ought to. Nor does one find members
of the American Embassy staff around the place in the sort of general way in which
American Embassies usually operate, and in which we try to operate ourselves.
Philip Kaiser is not very impressive and . . . one has great difficulty in remembering
the personalities at all.20 
Ellen M. Johnson, a secretary at the Embassy from 1964–66, noted
that prior to Labour’s election most officers of the Embassy other
than Bruce “hadn’t deemed it worthwhile getting to know the leaders
of the Labour Party, feeling the Conservatives and Liberals were the
ones to know”.21 Failings of this type led National Security Adviser
McGeorge Bundy to think that “the US Embassy was far too large
and far too overpaid and really produced very little.”22 
Even prior to his arrival in London, Bruce developed some firm
views about the value of the bonds between Britain and the United
States. He reached the conclusion that while Britain and the United
States should preserve close mutual ties, Washington should never-
theless use its influence to encourage the British to participate in the
movement towards European unity (Michael Palliser has described
Bruce as a “transatlantic” and “cosmopolitan” man with “a very
European feel to him,” and who was therefore naturally engaged
with the question of European unity).23 The experience of two world
wars bestowed an obvious wisdom upon trying to prevent a further
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332 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
conflagration, and consequently the need for European integration
seemed more worthy than London’s desire to sit at the diplomatic
“top table” next to the Americans. In 1950, for example, Bruce, then
US Ambassador to France, argued that American foreign policy was
too closely aligned with that of Britain. This position could have “an
extremely harmful” impact on Washington’s “other partners in the
Atlantic community . . . A special relationship of this kind” would be
“regarded on the continent as an abandonment by the US of any serious
attempt at European or even Atlantic community integration in
favour of an Anglo-American world alliance as the cornerstone of
US foreign policy.”24 
Although the “special relationship” remained evident at both the
elite and at the institutional levels, Bruce regarded Britain’s decision
in 1962 to apply to join the EEC as a “thrilling and momentous”
move. For him, British membership would be “one of the historical
events of our century,” offering the prospect of “lasting European
unity, with all that that would connote for the preservation of Western
civilisation against aggression from elsewhere.”25 It was not until
1973, however, that Britain would be able to enter the EEC; Bruce
was correct to question the impact of the “special relationship” upon
European observers. In December 1962, President de Gaulle of
France, using as an excuse the Kennedy administration’s recent
decision to sell the British Polaris nuclear missiles, vetoed Britain’s
application on the basis that the country would be a mere “Trojan
horse” for American influence in Europe. Although Bruce (now in
London) did not criticise the Polaris decision, the EEC failure was
undoubtedly a disappointment. Part of the Polaris understanding
held that the British should participate in a multilateral NATO naval
fleet, and in Bruce’s eyes this stipulation should on no account be
disregarded. To his way of thinking, such participation, while by no
means as momentous as joining the EEC, would nevertheless go
some way towards strengthening the British relationship with west-
ern Europe as well as bolstering the general principle of supra-
national integration. In November 1964, when the “Multilateral Force”
(MLF) issue had reemerged after a period of abeyance as a result of
the British general election, Bruce urged Undersecretary of State
George Ball (himself already a vigorous supporter of European
unity) that the United States “should be tough” with London over
the MLF. The assumption was that although the Labor government
would try to drive a hard bargain, it did not expect Washington to
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surrender completely. Bruce also wanted the State Department — which
was host to the most zealous advocates of the MLF — to direct the
negotiations.26 
Bruce did not express support for Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara’s assertion in June 1962 that independent nuclear arse-
nals such as that of Britain were a destabilizing force in world
affairs,27 but he did think that the MLF offered an excellent means
of enabling the UK to dispose of its “independent” deterrent. (To
mollify the advocates of unilateral nuclear disarmament on the left
of the Labour Party, Wilson had pledged to renegotiate the Polaris
agreement. But once in office Labour merely cancelled one of the
five Polaris submarines that the previous government had ordered.)
In December 1964, just before Wilson’s first prime ministerial visit
to Washington, Bruce tried to persuade Johnson that helping to do
away with the British nuclear deterrent would be valuable as a way
of enhancing the administration’s position in relation to Congress,
the goodwill and support of which was essential to the success of
the President’s ambitious programme of social legislation. Accord-
ing to the Ambassador, the White House would have “eliminated
one national deterrent” and would be “trying hard to avoid the
creation of another,” — that of West Germany, “while at the same
time binding Germany more firmly into the Atlantic Community
and more firmly to England.”28 Objections from Britain and other
European allies, concerns about the impact of the scheme on
nuclear proliferation, plus Johnson’s own reservations, meant that
ultimately the MLF came to nothing. However, even as late as
January 1966, when the project had all but run out of steam, Bruce
was urging the President to continue pursuing the creation of some
kind of collective nuclear arrangement for Europe.29 
Bruce’s tenacious backing of the MLF reflected his longstanding
view that Washington should encourage the British to seek closer
ties with the continent. Although this perspective followed the State
Department line, it also embodied a strongly held, more personal,
conviction on Bruce’s part, born of his extensive diplomatic experi-
ence working in Europe as well as his friendships with leading inte-
grationists such as Jean Monnet. While the Johnson White House
was generally supportive of the idea of British membership of the
EEC, the inevitable preoccupation with Vietnam meant that there
was little real engagement with the question of European unity. It was
also the case that overt American support for British membership
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334 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
would perpetuate the sort of concerns that de Gaulle had expressed
in 1962. 
Consistent with protocol, Bruce tendered his resignation soon
after Johnson became president and continued to do so every year,
but the new president, seeing no reason to make a change, asked him
to remain in his post. Lankford’s idea that Bruce now came “into his
own as ambassador in London”30 is based on the supposition that
compared to Kennedy, Johnson was unversed in international affairs
and was therefore especially reliant on ambassadorial counsel.
Certainly, the work of orthodox historians has, as noted by Thomas
Schwartz, tended to depict the thirty-sixth president as “the ugly
American” — crude, provincial and lacking subtlety in the conduct
of foreign affairs.31 Although the views of revisionists such as
Schwartz are kinder to Johnson’s standing in this regard, Vietnam
casts a long shadow and few commentators would go so far as to
argue that diplomacy was Johnson’s natural arena. In 1971 Bruce
argued circumspectly that Johnson would be considered a great
president with regard to his domestic policies of the “Great Society”
and civil rights, but the foreign policies — especially Vietnam —
were simply too controversial to permit a verdict.32 Early, contem-
porary perceptions supported the idea that Johnson was less at home
in international affairs than he was in the domestic sphere. The Brit-
ish Foreign Office, for example, noted in 1963 that he was ‘rela-
tively inexperienced’ in foreign affairs.33 Although he drew upon a
wide range of opinions when making decisions,34 there is no evi-
dence that his relative inexperience in the conduct of diplomacy led
him to turn all the more frequently to his ambassadors — firstly, like
all presidents, Johnson had a circle of foreign policy advisers at his
immediate disposal in Washington. This included Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy, all of whom
had served under Kennedy and were veterans of international crises
over Berlin, Cuba, Vietnam, Laos and elsewhere. 
Secondly, the frequency of Johnson’s consultation with his
ambassadors (beyond routine contacts at summit meetings) would
also depend on his interest in the countries involved, as well as the
exigencies of any current issues. Broadly speaking, he was inclined
to value allies not for any sentimental reasons but to the extent of
their practical contributions to the western alliance. The corollary of
this was that he tended to disdain those allied states he felt were not
pulling their weight in the world.35 In the light of Britain’s economic
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problems and the struggle to maintain a central role on the inter-
national stage, he once said that it was no longer worth spending two
days with a British prime minister because the UK “was not that
important anymore.”36 Yet that is not to say that Johnson was typi-
cally uninterested in developments in Britain as reported by Bruce;
the Foreign Office noted in July 1965 that the Ambassador had “the
advantage of at least part of one ear of the President.”37 Oliver
Wright and Michael Palliser, among others, have confirmed that
Johnson held Bruce in high esteem.38 Bruce and Johnson met at least
each of the six times Wilson visited Washington, and, more gener-
ally, the Ambassador helped maximise his influence by ensuring
that his written communications were pithy, incisive and — certainly
as far as those specifically directed to the White House were
concerned — sparing in number.39 Bruce’s view was that amba-
ssadors could shape events by their reporting but only if their des-
patches were read.40 
Many of Bruce’s missives concerned the British economy,
which had suffered for some years as a result of uncompetitive
industrial practices, an overvalued pound, and a resulting inability to
pay its way internationally. If Britain was obliged to devalue sterling
in order to deter continued speculative attacks on the currency and to
improve national competitiveness, there might be a wave of compet-
itive devaluations from other governments across the world. Then
the position of the United States could itself suffer. (Sterling was
finally devalued on November 18, 1967, from a parity of $2.80 to
$2.40. As it turned out, the international impact was relatively apoca-
lyptic). The US Treasury orchestrated three multilateral “bailouts” for
sterling when the currency faced intense speculative assault — in
November 1964, September 1965 and July 1966. Bruce’s verdicts
about the British economy were consistently — and, it has to be said,
exaggeratedly — pessimistic, and seemed on occasions to reflect the
misperception that Wilson was a radical politician rather than a
moderate. In October 1964, as soon as Labour had assumed power,
Bruce expressed concern to the State Department about the likeli-
hood of economic radicalism or recklessness on the part of the new
government, whose underlying aim, he argued, was to eliminate
“sectors of the free enterprise system.” The City feared the “antici-
pated proposals for taxation,” which could well lead to “a further
diminuition of confidence, already impaired by a Labour victory,
amongst Britain’s creditors.”41 (In truth, Labour’s budgets tended
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more towards austerity than profligacy.) A few weeks later, Bruce
warned with continued overstatement about the wider damage that
Harold Wilson might inflict on the UK: the Prime Minister was “too
steeped in the early fifties, too devoted to outmoded dogmas, too
suspicious of the motives of others. It may well be that he believes
in the necessity for class warfare to extirpate residual privileges.”42
At the end of a typically bleak economic commentary in 1967,
Bruce added that ‘Things will get worse before they get better.”43 
At least one individual in the White House regarded Bruce’s
prognostications as excessively grim: Francis Bator of the National
Security Council, for one, argued to Johnson in July 1966 that the
Ambassador was “too gloomy about Britain’s economic prospects”;
the situation was certainly not “hopeless.”44 There were others who
doubted Bruce’s wisdom in the field of economics. According Willis
Armstrong, who worked in the Embassy’s Economic Section, much
of the alarmism of Bruce’s analyses derived from sheer ignorance:
he was “not very experienced in economic matters.” Bruce once sent
a particularly depressing telegram to George Ball and John Leddy,
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. “God,” the Ambassador
told Armstrong, “they both called me up in the middle of the night,
all excited. I guess I didn’t show you that telegram.” According to
Armstrong, the despatch in question was mere “hysteria about the
British economy . . . about Britain going “down the tube.” He
explained to Bruce that ‘there isn’t any tube big enough for an econ-
omy the size of the British to go down. It either gets worse to the
point it can’t pay its bills, and then it has to shape up, or it gets bet-
ter. It won’t go away. There isn’t any place for it to disappear to.’
Armstrong noted later that Princeton University “dedicated a chair
for David Bruce at the Woodrow Wilson School. George Ball gave
the appreciation. It was mostly about David’s career in the OSS. The
OSS is not a good place to learn economics.”45 
Despite his reservations about Labour’s economic policies, from
the outset Bruce enjoyed close relations with the representatives of
the Labour government. James Tull, one of Bruce’s colleagues in
the Embassy’s Executive Section, noted that, “before the election
when Wilson was shadow prime minister, he occasionally lunched
privately with the ambassador at the embassy.” Thus, when Labour
entered office, Bruce “did not lose a beat in the contact area — to be
expected, I guess, given the ambassador’s span on acquaintances
across political, economic, clerical, and press and broadcast lines.”46
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Bruce’s personality — urbane, cheerful, charming, discrete — per-
mitted him to move very easily in establishment circles.47 Further-
more, his judgment of political personalities was often perceptive,
and he understood from an early date that Wilson was determined to
preserve and to strengthen the Anglo-American relationship. The
Ambassador forecasted in October 1964 that Washington should
prepare itself “for a greater degree of high level negotiation with the
British than has been our previous experience.”48 He explained to
Johnson late the following year that the Prime Minister was “anx-
ious to establish . . . something like the close relationship — or its
appearance — which existed between Harold Macmillan and Presi-
dent Kennedy.”49 Wilson was in effect his own foreign secretary, a
policy that would involve frequent dealings with the US Amba-
ssador and, certainly, when possible, with the President himself. 
Given its salience in US foreign policy and in the wider interna-
tional environment, the question of the Vietnam War could hardly
fail to touch upon the Anglo-American relationship. Until March
1966 Wilson commanded only a single-figure majority in the House
of Commons and was always obliged to placate the anti-American
left wing of the Parliamentary Labour Party lest its agitation became
unmanageable, and he also had to address a climate of public opin-
ion that was increasingly hostile to America’s “imperialist” war in
the former Indochina. With the relatively modest exception of the
“dissociation” of 1966 (considered below) Wilson did not yield to
temptation by adopting an anti-American policy. He opposed the
idea of a precipitate withdrawal by American forces, because such a
measure might “bring with it the danger that friend and potential foe
throughout the world would begin to wonder whether the United
States might be induced to abandon other allies when the going got
rough.”50 Given the controversy in Britain, Bruce regarded as “dar-
ing” the official British policy of diplomatic support for the basic
principle of American involvement in Vietnam.51 
As “a faithful instrument” of President Johnson, Bruce was far
too professional ever to express public misgivings about American
policies,52 but in private he did question the wisdom of the escalat-
ing American involvement in Vietnam. In early 1962, he confided to
a journalist that he was “not sure that we should have made a com-
mitment to either Laos or South Vietnam in the first place. Getting
bogged down with larger numbers of men but without confronting
the real enemy is the way to suffer real attrition.”53 Later, he told
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Charles Cross, an Asian specialist at the London Embassy, that
Vietnam was “distracting our attention from Europe and that there-
fore we should probably disengage from there.”54 But Bruce knew
that once the United States had proclaimed its commitment to the
world then it was difficult to retreat without undermining the
credibility of American pledges. 
While Bruce, as an ambassador to a European state, was rarely
if ever consulted by his masters in Washington on what they should
do in Vietnam, he often tried to persuade American policy-makers
to value Britain’s loyalty to the American position. As a social-
democratic state with ample experience in diplomacy, this loyalty was
important in helping to confer a greater degree of legitimacy upon
American actions. Unfortunately, the UK’s failure to provide more
practical forms of help and the British propensity for high-profile
peacemaking initiatives meant that the Ambassador’s counsel often
fell on stony ground. In March 1965, he explained to the State
Department the intense “restiveness here, especially in the House of
Commons, over the British Government not seeming to play a more
active part in trying to induce negotiations over Vietnam.”55 Wilson
was “under intense domestic pressure to intervene as mediator,”56
and was “hotly accused by many British, including a formidable
number of moderate Labour Parliamentarians, of being a mere satel-
lite of the US, and of subscribing blindly and completely to policies
about which he has not been consulted in advance.”57 In the Com-
mons Wilson once mounted an especially vigorous defence of
American policy in Vietnam, which so impressed Bruce that he
thought it deserved an expression of gratitude from the highest level
in Washington. “Perhaps,” the Ambassador asked Dean Rusk, “if
the President thought favourably of it, it might be well for him to
send a personal communication to the PriMin, expressing thanks for
his support.”58 It was telling, however, that the “personal communi-
cation” from Johnson to Wilson that the Ambassador felt would be
beneficial was not forthcoming. However, on this occasion the
Ambassador’s efforts to cultivate some appreciation in Washington
of Wilson’s support did succeed at least to a modest extent, by
encouraging McGeorge Bundy (himself no Anglophile), to take up
the case. On March 22, he tried to persuade Johnson to try to “see
what is the least we can offer the British in return for continued soli-
darity in support of the essentials of our policy in Vietnam.” Bruce,
noted Bundy, had argued that there should be “a full and continuing
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exchange of views and of information at all levels between our two
Governments on this important issue.”59 
The idea was merely to make the British feel that their support
was valued, but the problem was as much one of personality as of
policies: the President simply did not like Wilson, and thus felt little
inclined to mollify him. Only a few days later Bruce lamented in his
diary that that he and Bundy had a “ticklish matter to resolve”:
Johnson “has an antipathy for the Prime Minister”, and, in particular,
he considered that “attempts on the part of the British to insinuate
themselves into Vietnamese affairs” were “irrelevant and imperti-
nent”. The President believed that Wilson, “for his own domestic,
political purposes, wishes to capitalise on a supposed close relation-
ship that is non-existent.” The Ambassador hoped that Johnson should
behave with at least a degree of finesse, to “give the impression of
good relations” in the next meeting with Wilson, because “The PM
needs at least to be able to portray to his associates, and in the House
of Commons, the appearance of an intimacy and a mutual confi-
dence.” There was “no room, in my opinion, for [a] lack of conven-
tional courtesies between chiefs of allied states,” noted Bruce with
some disdain towards Johnson’s attitudes.60 
Part of the challenge for Bruce’s efforts to manage the relation-
ship between 10 Downing Street and the White House was that on
occasions Wilson acted in ways that impeded the task. On February 11,
1965, for example, the growing political pressures in London led
the Prime Minister to make a late night telephone call to Johnson
(3:00 am in London, 10:00 pm Washington time), urging an ad hoc
Anglo-American summit, with the aim of dissuading an over-
aggressive retaliation to a recent attack upon a US base at Pleiku.
Johnson’s response was a famously blunt one, saying, in effect, that
it was none of Wilson’s business how the United States conducted
its affairs.61 Bruce responded soon after by advising Wilson that “it
was better to communicate with the President by teletype, because a
man like Johnson to whom reaching for the telephone was second
nature and principally an instrument to pressure people, did not like
others using it to put him on the spot.”62 A few weeks later there was
a further example of diplomatic clumsiness on the part of the British
when Wilson asked his foreign secretary, Michael Stewart, who was
visiting Washington, to raise the issue of the use of poison gas in
Vietnam, the American use of gas had inflamed opinion in the
House of Commons.63 Stewart brought up the topic but to ill-effect,
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with the President complaining later that it was “insulting for politi-
cians to come chasing over to see him, to expound for home con-
sumption their condemnatory statements from the White House
steps.”64 Bundy responded by telephoning Bruce on Johnson’s
behalf to tell him “to prepare a draft of a possible letter to the Prime
Minister, expressing the President’s indignation over Michael Stewart
having answered a question at the National Press Club by replying
with a citation from the Declaration of Independence.” Stewart had
“coupled British objections” to the American use of gas “with a
quotation about the ‘decent observance of the opinions of man-
kind’.” But Bruce finally persuaded Johnson not to “rebuke” Wilson
for Stewart’s “delinquency,” “a great relief . . . for I thought it would
be undignified and unnecessary to do so.”65 To have the US Amba-
ssador berating the Prime Minister was no way to bring harmony to
the higher reaches of the Anglo-American relationship. 
The year 1966 saw still more of Bruce’s intervention over Vietnam.
Ironically, while Labour’s narrow majority in the Commons had
caused problems for Wilson with regard to his commitment to the
American axis, an expanded majority was to pose even greater diffi-
culties. On March 31 of that year, Labour won the general election
with a decisive 94 seat majority, thereby giving rise to an expanded
and especially fractious Labour left that would bedevil the Prime
Minister’s already fraught attempts to strike a balance between Party
opinion on the one hand and Washington on the other. A State
Department report indicated that the standard-bearers of the “New
Left” included some “traditional left-wingers such as Michael
Foot,” along with some “new elements, principally educators or
journalists, who are doctrinaire, articulate, and constructive.” Unlike
their “Bevanite forbears, the New Left is not trying to displace”
Wilson, but to drive him back to a more “socialist” approach.66 This
would involve the pursuit of a more independent policy towards
Washington. In July 1966, Wilson felt obliged to “dissociate” Britain
from the latest American military measures, and Bruce found
himself called upon to explain this action from a man who had so
frequently expressed loyalty to the United States. Bruce told the
State Department that when Wilson took office he was “prepared to
cooperate with the United States on major American policies in a
measure that would not always be popular” in Britain. “Never-
theless, to counter the charge of being a mere puppet or satellite of
the US, HMG would, from time to time, assert its independence by
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taking exception to certain details of policies to which he is ready to
give general support.” Bruce advised that Johnson should “content
himself with remarking on his disappointment” over the dissociation
“and say he expects continuing fidelity to the promise of adherence
to our overall objectives in Vietnam.”67 On one occasion during the
dissociation crisis, Wilson practically pleaded with Bruce in order to
secure a personal meeting with the President as a way of easing the
rift. The Prime Minister explained that he was “absolutely confident
he could avoid any embarrassment to the President during his visit
to Washington.” Bruce was persuaded by Wilson’s assurances,
reporting that the Labour leader wanted the President to be certain
that “he does not believe in making a mess on another fellow’s car-
pet.”68 He believed that Wilson should indeed be permitted to visit
Washington, to help repair “the personal relationship” with
Johnson.69 The visit went ahead, in fact surprisingly smoothly in
view of the precedents, not least because Wilson took Bruce’s
advice and renewed his pledges of fealty to the United States.70 
In January 1967, the Ambassador tried to assuage the Prime
Minister’s concerns that the White House was failing to keep
London fully informed about developments in Vietnam.71 Part of the
disquiet stemmed from the fact, as Bruce noted, that the British were
“always interested in trying to ascertain whether their own contacts
could not be used . . . to bring about a settlement of the affair in
Vietnam.”72 He was involved in a major British peacemaking initiative
in February 1967, which Wilson described with a touch of hyper-
bole as “an exercise planned between the Prime Minister and the
Ambassador which only just failed to secure peace in Vietnam.”73
The intention was to use the visit to London of the Russian premier
Alexei Kosygin to initiate fruitful contacts with the communist
regime in North Vietnam. In Wilson’s self-serving account, Bruce is
alleged to have said that the Wilson-Kosygin initiative was “going
to be the biggest diplomatic coup of the century.”74 In truth, he
neither encouraged nor discouraged the Prime Minister in his peace-
making venture; the Ambassador’s “laidback style” meant that he
was more a “detached observer” of these events than a prime
mover.75 He was also too shrewd and well-informed to believe that
there was much substance to the British efforts. Hanoi had given no
intimation at all that it was ready to make concessions at the nego-
tiating table, and for reasons of its own Washington decided to
toughen its policy toward negotiations at the eleventh hour. As a
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result of the change in policy, Bruce had to dissuade an angry Prime
Minister from flying to the White House forthwith: “it would not be
wise for the Prime Minister to dash off to Washington . . . since it
would appear to be an act of panic and hysteria,”76 and was in any
case likely to antagonise the President, who was always hostile to
the idea of an ad hoc summit with Wilson. But the fact that Bruce
had to some extent participated in the diplomatic maneuverings
undermined, albeit temporarily, his own standing in the White
House — Johnson condemned Bruce’s apparent desire to be a “God-
damned peacemaker” like Wilson,77 and questioned sarcastically
whether in trying to extend the bombing pause to cover the duration
of Kosygin’s visit to London if Bruce was himself frightened of get-
ting hit by an American bomb.78 
Philip Kaiser argues that to prevail on the question of a suspen-
sion of bombing Bruce had “decided to send one of his cables direct
to the President. When Johnson read it, he overruled his top advisers
and ordered them to follow Bruce’s recommendation to delay the
resumption of bombing until Kosygin had returned home.” The
cable was “brought to the President while he was meeting with his
top advisers.” Robert McNamara was apparently “the first to react,
arguing in favour of resuming the bombing immediately,” and ask-
ing “What does Bruce know about Vietnam?”79 The reality of these
events was more mundane. National Security Adviser Walt Rostow
told Johnson of Bruce’s opinion over the telephone, saying that he
had been “vehement in saying that if we resume bombing even in the
southern part of Vietnam...we will remove the possibility of Kosygin’s
being helpful for some time to come.”80 Soon after, Rusk confirmed
Bruce’s view in a memorandum to the President, saying that he had
“given me his extremely strong judgment that if we resume oper-
ations against North Vietnam tonight, it would mean that the Soviets
would refuse to discuss the matter seriously tomorrow, there will be
a break-up on the issue, and the break-up would be blamed wholly
on our action.” Rusk supported Bruce’s advice, and informed him
later that day that Johnson had accepted the counsel.81 
A few weeks later, a disenchanted Wilson, feeling that he had
been treated badly by Washington, explained to the Ambassador
that he had been “considering the possibility of moving toward the
middle, between the two nations, on Vietnamese policy,” so that his
peace proposals might be more likely to prosper and also to grant
him some respite from the disaffected Labour left. Bruce urged to
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the contrary, that Wilson should “keep in close contact with the
President, being mindful of the close relationship between our coun-
tries and of the friendship of the President.”82 He was soon
reminded, though, of the Prime Minister’s odd personal and political
dependency on Johnson, which meant that despite his mutterings the
Prime Minister was never likely to make fundamental changes in his
policy towards the United States. The Ambassador noted in his diary
that Michael Palliser had called “to say that the Prime Minister was
concerned” about a certain newspaper article which “alleged dissatis-
faction and lack of warmth on the President’s part toward the Prime
Minister.” Under instructions from Wilson, Palliser asked Bruce if
he could find “any recent statements by the President laudatory of
the Prime Minister.” Bruce assumed that Wilson expected to be
“questioned about this article in the House,” and, in a commentary on
the bonds at the highest level of the Anglo-American relationship,
noted that “there has been no occasion for the President recently” to
make favourable pronouncements about Wilson.83 
The continued delicacy of the Vietnam issue in particular was
such that in February 1968 while helping to draft a White House
dinner toast for Wilson, Bruce counseled that there should be no
“references to Vietnam; or at least to the British role in support of
our efforts.”84 Later, a report by Louis Heren in the Times intimated
that Johnson did not hold the Prime Minister in high regard.85 Once
again, a worried Wilson sent Palliser to make enquiries of Bruce,
this time to ask whether Heren’s article was a faithful reflection of
Johnson’s opinions. Bruce “concluded on the basis of his own
knowledge of the President’s point of view, that this [article] must
be the outcome of a personal talk with the President,” not least
because it condemned Labour’s recent announcement of an “acce-
lerated withdrawal” of British forces from Asia.86 
Lankford indicates that “it was America’s traditional anti-
imperialist stance — which Bruce emphatically did not share — that
encouraged the British retreat from empire.”87 In February 1965, the
Ambassador attributed Britain’s balance of payments problems
rather simplistically to the decline of the empire and the common-
wealth,88 but it was certainly not the case that, as Lankford implies,
he was an old-fashioned imperialist who supported the long-term
preservation of the colonial empires, nor was the United States
exerting pressure upon the British to abandon the global bases that
were a legacy of the imperial era. In fact, the climate of the Cold
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War meant that Washington was keenly appreciative of the geopoli-
tical utility of Britain’s East of Suez bases. But the far-flung defence
commitments that this entailed were a considerable economic bur-
den for the UK. Indicating the need for economies, Wilson told
Bruce in November 1964 that “Britain was at the moment trying to
fulfil three roles — the independent nuclear deterrent, the conventional
role in Europe, and a world role East of Suez.”89 A 1964 Foreign
Office document noted that Britain’s defence spending was increasing
from £1,596 million in 1960–61 to an estimated £2,141 million in
1965–66 and an estimated £2,400 million by 1969–70.90 Some £300
million was spent overseas each year on “defence and related acti-
vities.”91 Wilson told Bruce in November 1964 that although he was
“an East of Suez man . . . he did not see how his government could
keep up the present rate of expenditure in that area.”92 Bruce noted
that cuts East of Suez commended themselves “in both budgetary
and foreign exchange savings (at a time when no other sources for
welfare spending and investment incentives are in view) and it
appeals to the growing number who, for doctrinal and emotional
reasons, want to reduce Britain’s world role.”93 
In summer 1967, contrary to Wilson’s numerous assurances to
Washington, the British revealed plans to withdraw from most of
their positions East of Suez by the mid-1970s, and early the next
year it was further announced that the pace of withdrawal would be
accelerated to provide for withdrawal by 1971. The proposals
caused immense distress to the US Ambassador, as they seemed tant-
amount to a betrayal of US foreign policy, which was already under
assault both at home and abroad owing to the Vietnam debacle.
Bruce complained to Foreign Secretary George Brown that the UK’s
intention to make “a unilateral determination” to withdraw from
East of Suez was: 
more likely to cause bitter controversy between the US and UK Governments than any
other issue between us during the last few years . . . the appearance of our being
deserted . . . in the midst of our Vietnamese involvement, by a Government assumed to
be our most reliable ally, headed by a Prime Minister who had repeatedly declared him-
self an “East of Suez Man” was unwise, provocative, and absolutely unacceptable.94 
While continuing to rue the UK’s relinquishment of most of its
extra-European strategic commitments, Bruce indicated later that
the bonds between Britain and the United States were already
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changing, in part because the UK was now pursuing its second bid
to join the EEC. The United States, said Bruce, would “derive mas-
sive and fortunate benefits” from “the existence of a cohesive and
united Europe” that would include the UK. The American govern-
ment would be able to continue its “bilateral relations with the con-
stituent states, but, on matters where they speak with a single voice,
their influence, coupled with our own, should serve for generations
to come as the most practicable connection available to induce peace
and order.” The “entry of the UK into Europe, via common institutions,
should strengthen, not impair, our easy intercourse with it and its
new associates.” In any case, the “so-called Anglo-American special
relationship is now little more than sentimental terminology,
although the underground waters of it will flow with a deep current.”95
Bruce’s statements indicate that a key prop of the Anglo-American
relationship, Britain’s standing as a world power, was soon to give
way. However, all was not lost: the reference to “the underground
waters” indicated that less visible forms of cooperation — such as
that between the diplomatic, defence and the intelligence establish-
ments — would continue to the mutual benefit of each state. Of
Bruce’s reports in the Wilson-Johnson years, this was certainly the
most significant, given that it charts so well a distinct running down of
the Anglo-American relationship against the background of Britain’s
turn towards Europe. 
Optimistically, Bruce argued that the EEC application would
probably succeed, telling the State Department in October 1966 that
“British strategy and tactics during the past six months have been
both intelligent and effective,” and anticipating that de Gaulle,
although remaining opposed to British membership, seemed “unwilling
or unable to use the flat veto because it would create crisis in the
Community” and was “bad French domestic politics, given public
support for British entry.”96 Yet in December 1967 de Gaulle con-
founded Bruce’s prediction by rejecting the British application,
partly on the grounds that the UK’s apparently close connections
with Washington would mean “continued US domination of
Europe” if the British were permitted to join the Common Market.
The French leader believed that Britain “would have to totally
change its traditions, outlook and commitments abroad (such as
Hong Kong and Singapore).”97 There was a notable tension between
the UK’s position as a world power and the pursuit of a more European
role. Wilson told his Cabinet on, June 6, that the turn towards Europe
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meant that “the concept of a special relationship between the United
States and ourselves was . . . undergoing a gradual modification,
although close relations in the shape of continuing consultations on
international affairs would no doubt continue.”98 George Ball was
among those in Washington who understood the incongruence of the
British ambitions in Europe and the retention of a global role. In July
1966, he argued that Washington should try to discourage British
claims of a “special relationship” with the United States, by easing
the pressure for a continued British commitment East of Suez and by
expressing a willingness to take part in some kind of financial oper-
ation to facilitate British membership in the EEC.99 
Bruce himself once noted that in the eyes of many British
observers the proposed East of Suez reductions were thought “to
strengthen the Common Market bid.”100 There was therefore a cer-
tain contradiction between championing British membership of the
EEC and his concurrent, emotional opposition to the abrogation of
the East of Suez role. While he understood that Britain’s spending
on defence abroad was “out of hand, [and] seemed to be out of
proportion to the political gains that might have been had as a
result of continuing as previously,”101 there is little evidence that
Bruce managed to square the circle that if the country had been
prosperous enough to sustain the world role there would have been
little need to turn towards the EEC for economic rehabilitation.102
By the time he finally left London in 1969, Britain lacked either of
the international roles that he had supported so firmly over the
years: the “world power” status was moribund, and there was no
countervailing membership of the EEC. Developments such as
these had led the Ambassador to suggest that it would cause him
“no heartburn whatever” when the time came for him to move on
from London.103 
In conclusion, while questions have been raised about Bruce’s
relative remoteness from the day-to-day operations of the Embassy,
he was by no means remote from Harold Wilson and senior Labour
Party politicians; Michael Palliser has suggested that on occasions
Bruce seemed almost “omnipresent.”104 Wilson, who saw Bruce fre-
quently at Chequers as well as 10 Downing Street, was very much
inclined to use him as a key medium of communication with the
White House: the Ambassador’s “standing with the President,
his discretion, and his bankerish connections . . . made him more
convincing than professorish types.”105 The mutual dealings of Wilson
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and Bruce were so frequent as to be entirely routine; it can be said
with confidence that few if any prime ministers have ever attached
so much importance to establishing a close relationship with an
American ambassador. Wilson saw a close, informal relationship
with Bruce as the first step towards establishing a corresponding
relationship with the White House — that was one reason why under
him “the United States ambassador to the Court of St James’ always
found an “open door at Downing Street.”106 Yet Wilson was also to
argue that ‘Despite the very special position that David Bruce held
in London, with his direct access to the White House . . . the Prime
Ministerial-Ambassadorial relationship is relatively unimportant.”
One of the reasons for this assertion was that prime ministers tend to
find themselves with “far too much to do on the home front on eco-
nomic and social questions and legislation.”107 
There are also limits to the influence in Washington even of an
ambassador as well-regarded as Bruce. He strove to persuade US
policy-makers of the value of the UK’s diplomatic support over
Vietnam, but the administration had little native sympathy for the
British and became increasingly preoccupied with the more critical
issue of events on the ground in Vietnam itself, as well as the growing
furore in the United States. Thus many of Bruce’s counsels trying to
encourage his colleagues in Washington to value British support of
American policy were largely fruitless. On the economic front, the
White House proved receptive to the Ambassador’s more negative
ideas, given the worries that a substantial devaluation of sterling
might precipitate a major international economic upheaval. In August
1965, Johnson told William Martin of the Federal Reserve that he
had “never had any confidence” in the British ability to handle eco-
nomic questions.108 Undoubtedly, some of this pessimism had roots
in Bruce’s gloomy exegesis. 
More positively, Bruce’s diaries and his despatches offer an
essential — and eloquent — perspective on Anglo-American rela-
tions in the 1960s. He captured well the tensions in the relationship
at a critical time, including the difficulty imposed by the UK’s
moves away from the world role in favour of a more modest,
Europe-centred vocation — although there are few indications of him
accepting that one development fostered the other. In the light of
these events, Bruce’s 1967 cable dismissing the Anglo-American
“special relationship” as mere “sentimental terminology” found echoes
in later commentaries in Washington. In June 1968, for example, a
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State Department analysis reflected that Britain’s future was “at
best, a middle-sized European power, albeit one with a nuclear
capability, a residual sense of extra-European responsibility and a
continuing, if diminished, status as a favored partner of the US.”109
While Bruce did manage to ease some of the strains between Wilson
and Johnson, he could exert but little influence on the deeper develop-
ments in the Anglo-American relationship. 
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